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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Laura Pinto’s paper is about the rationale for a specific educational policy decision 
that came to be made in Ontario. It is a rich text that demonstrates well the 
complexities of educational policy making; how it is shaped and justified by “values, 
self-interest, mobilization efforts and lobbying power” and, we might add, wishful 
thinking. This is Laura’s conclusion: “These arguments rested on little more than 
‘truthiness’ (that is, claims of knowing something intuitively without regard for 
evidence, logic, or facts), rather than on the application of serious reasoning and the 
consideration of empirical evidence”. To a large extent empirical evidence was 
neglected in this process, Laura argues, and this is her main concern.  
As all commentary on rich texts, this one can take many different directions. 
For example, rhetorical analyses; how social problems are made into educational 
problems and thus left to schools to solve; the causal presuppositions underlying 
views of the possible effects of policy decisions, etc. After debating the possibilities 
with myself I have decided to concentrate mainly on one issue; namely question of 
what evidence can do for us.  
 
2. EVIDENCE 
 
The educational policy in question in financial literacy education (FLE) in 4-12 
education, instituted worldwide in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis. 
Sections 2 and 3 of the paper provide a thorough description of the background for 
FLE and of the political rhetoric that surrounded FLE in Ontario. This is no small 
task. A corpus of political rhetoric has been carefully collected, systematized, 
analyzed and interpreted. Laura describes her approach as grounded theory. GT has 
been criticized for being empiricist and (naively) inductive, so how comfortable 
should we be in using it? 
 Providing structure to this messy and rather bewildering field of political 
rhetoric around FLE is a daunting task, and can evidently be done in several ways. 
Laura has settled on a structure which foregrounds attitudes of various actors 
(different arguments for) toward FLE: 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b. I admit I found it hard to 
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keep them apart and remember which was which as the analysis moved on through 
its various layers. 
1a: FLE is urgently needed 
1b: FLE should be developed and enacted through a financial industry and 
government partnership 
2a: While FLE might be valuable, it should be developed without industry 
involvement 
2b: Principled support of FLE, but critical of the financial sector (that created the 
problems in the first place) 
 To make a long story short, they arrive at the basically same conclusion (in 
favor of FLE) but the routes by which they do so differ, as the paper makes clear. 
The problem with the arguments is that they over-simplify and rely on truthiness 
instead of evidence-based policy. They fail to use evidence effectively and accurately, 
and the nuances and complexities of the problems got lost in a truthy, rhetorical 
mist. 
 The truthy rhetorical mist is well-documented in the paper, it seems to me. 
But it may be that Laura is a bit too optimistic about what evidence can actually do 
for us, and I shall outline some questions that I hope can be food for further thought. 
I shall focus on FLE as a case of evidence-based policy, although many other types of 
facts and data have a role to play, as Laura points out. 
 Let us begin by looking at the desired effect, since this generally forms the 
basis for our judgments of how well a policy works. The wishful thinkers, those who 
think that FLE can solve the financial crisis (the 1a group), clearly had a long-term 
goal in mind for FLE. And complicated, in that FLE targets individuals whereas 
“financial crisis” is an aggregate entity – the idea must be that people learn to think 
differently, thereby they act differently, and in the long run their different actions 
aggregate in such a way as to alleviate the financial target. If this is what we expect 
of FLE, it is no wonder that no evidence exists to support its efficacy – it has still to 
show itself.  
 The same problem exists if you test people at the end of a FLE course and 
find that by and large their understanding of financial matters hasn’t changed much. 
That is the short-term effect, but we do not in principle know what the long-term 
effects might be. In many cases of evidence-based practice, the short-term effects 
are preferred because the results can be so easily traced to the intervention and we 
(think we) immediately can pass judgment on whether it works or not. 
 But let us assume that wishful thinking is okay. How confident can we be that 
our policy will achieve our desired outcome should we implement it? What kind of 
considerations should we make, and what can the evidence tell us? Laura suggests 
that data about FLE was largely ignored, but what could it have told us? Suppose 
data from several FLE experiments suggested that FLE worked well, that the 
assumed causal connection between policy and effect is established. That, Nancy 
Cartwright argues (e.g. Cartwright, 2012; Cartwright & Hardie, 2012), tells us only 
that it works somewhere, not that it works generally. But can we use that evidence to 
predict that the policy will work for us? No, she says. The evidence may be highly 
trustworthy (especially if it is an RCT design), but trustworthiness and relevance are 
two different things. The fact that FLE worked “there” does not imply that it will also 
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work “here”. Or vice versa, we might add: the fact that FLE is ineffective “there” does 
not imply that it will not work “here”. 
 Evidence in itself is thus not enough, on Cartwright’s view (and she does 
argue well for her case). A policy, no matter how well evidenced it is, is only one 
part of the large constellation of factors, and the overall effect (e.g. solving the 
financial crisis) depends on how all these factors add up. If we want to predict 
whether it will work for us, there is a whole host of other facts we also need to 
ascertain.  
Policies may be highly complex, but basically they encompass what 
Cartwright calls causal principles: a causal connection between a cause and an effect, 
a policy and its result, input and output (both may be large entities). I think there is 
a tendency to think that these are general, they hold in and of themselves so that 
once we have established such a principle it can be safely generalized across many 
contexts (this seems to be a basic presupposition of most EBP approaches). But this 
is a mistake, argues Cartwright. Causal principles typically vary, they are in fact local 
and they hold ceteris paribus. They arise out of and are supported by the local 
causal/social structure, and since such local structures cannot be supposed to be 
homogeneous, we cannot simply transfer a principle that holds “there” to “here”. 
“Here” may have a causal structure in which the policy does not have the requisite 
“bridges” that allows it to travel to the effect. The world is too diverse, she says. 
Evidence of how a policy works “there” is thus useful, but of very limited relevance.  
So we need facts about “there” and “here”. Are the local causal/social 
structures sufficiently similar? More importantly, are the factors necessary for the 
policy to work in place? If not, your policy will not work –it does not have the 
structure it needs to work through. This set of necessary factors Cartwright calls the 
“support team”.  
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
I keep badgering my students with the importance of evidence; to provide it 
themselves and to demand it from others. It thus feels a bit odd to put forward a 
viewpoint that reduces the role of evidence. The crux is what we want evidence for. 
In research we want evidence to judge the trustworthiness of our claims about the 
world. But in the policy context things are somewhat different. Evidence for 
trustworthiness of, say, a causal claim is not thereby also evidence for what will 
happen when we implement that causal claim. In the policy context the role of 
evidence is changed and reduced, and other considerations are foregrounded: what 
we need to know to make a reliable prediction about whether FLE will work “here”; 
about what might happen when we implement it. True, some of these may also need 
evidence, e.g. in the form of statistics about people’s financial behavior, but some of 
the facts about local conditions we can ascertain by experience, by seeing for 
ourselves.  
It would be fun, perhaps, to investigate the rhetorical political mist with an 
eye to the following: 
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- In the midst of all the factors featured in Laura’s paper, what causal 
role can FLE possibly play? 
- What might a good support team consist of if FLE is going to have 
good effect? I have no suggestion, really, except to say that it of course 
depends on what sort of effect you want, and that there might be 
many such factors and that they might be at different levels of 
aggregation (parental involvement, market regulation, perhaps?) 
- How should we understand “will work”? That we can observe specific 
results? Some form of average value? Or simply that it contributes 
positively?  
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